contradictory forces emerged: the first based on the affirmation of the powers of this, as opposed to a transcendent, world and of human subjects within it to make themselves; the second based on attempts to reestablish transcendent (although not necessarily other-worldly) control over those powers, attempts that arrived at the concept of modern sovereignty. Berman (1983) outlines three successive waves of change that affect Europe and the world from the early seventeenth century, but reserves the term modernity for the post-Enlightenment nineteenth-century period, when, as Williams (1988) notes, "modern" acquired a positive meaning. Escobar (2004: 211) says that, for dominant theories of modernity in general, "modernity has identifiable temporal and spatial origins: 17th century northern Europe, around the processes of Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution. These processes crystallised at the end of the 18th century and became consolidated with the Industrial Revolution." Scott Lash sides with theorists such as Daniel Bell in distinguishing between modernity (or, for some, modernization) and modernism. In this scheme, modernity as an economic and technological process began in the sixteenth century, while modernism, dating from the late nineteenth century, is seen as a cultural or aesthetic reaction to the contradictions created by that process (Smart 1990: 17-9) . This distinction has also been seen as particularly relevant to Latin America where, for some, economic and social modernity has lagged behind or at least been in disjuncture with cultural modernism (García Canclini 1995: 41-65; Schwarz 1992) .
Anthropological Approaches to Modernity
I think many anthropologists are broadly happy with these kinds of approach and do not worry too much about the periodizations and disputes. Modernity can be generally understood as "what results from the diversified impact of capitalism on social formations across the world," as Moreiras (2001: 3) paraphrases Charles Taylor, although one might want to add something about the impact of Western scientific rationality and other formalized, calculative rationalities (in the Weberian sense). Many approaches to the "anthropology of modernity" base themselves on this kind of broad view of the subject.
In my view, common anthropological approaches to modernity take two main avenues. The first is simply to expand the purview of anthropology beyond the non-Western to include an ethnography of the West. This is unobjectionable in itself and actually has a longish history within anthropology. It could, of course, imply an unexamined division between the "traditional" non-West and the "modern" West, but I think most anthropologists would reject such easy dualisms-at least at first sight. The second avenue leads to an analysis of processes of resignification and hybridization. This is about exploring how "local," usually non-Western people, adapt objects, ideas, and symbols from global circuits of production, consumption, and knowledge, indigenizing, resignifying, appropriating, and hybridizing them in the process and perhaps generating "multiple" or "alternative" modernities (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Englund and Leach 2000; Inda and Rosaldo 2001; Miller 1995) . Debates then center around the way both homogenization and differentiation occur at the same time and how continuity and change are to be perceived and analyzed (Robbins 2004; Sahlins 1999; Wilk 1995) . Again, nowadays, many anthropologists would resist a clear division between the local and the global, as if localities were neat, bounded places that simply suffered the impact of external, global forces. However, it is worth noting a certain mutual reinforcement of the spatial and the temporal here: modernity is not only "after" tradition (although it is "before" it when it comes to reaching the future), it is "beyond" locality and acts as the "wider context" for it.
Teleology and Scale
I think parallel dualisms between traditional and modern, local and global, and subordinate (subaltern) and dominant (hegemonic) often remain at a deeper level in anthropological approaches. It may be the case that, as Dunkerley (2000: 51) says, we are currently in a " 'globalised' climate, when everything on the planet is linked to everything else without hesitation or embarrassment." But I would argue that analytic linkages continue to be made in ways that betray vestiges of dualisms. I also argue that anthropology can offer ways to undo these dualisms, and their associated effects of scaling and teleology (and ultimately Eurocentrism), as long as these ways are pursued thoroughly. The paradoxical commitment of anthropology to cultural relativism (particularism) but also cultural equality (universalism) highlights the fact that all people are coeval, that "we are all modern"-or that we have all "never been modern" to adapt Latour's phrase (Latour 1993) . Of course, this insight has been part of anthropology's critique of its own intellectual heritage. Insisting that everyone is equally modern is not the same as saying that Western modernity has accomplished a full sweep; rather it is a way of contesting the Eurocentric assumption that some are "ahead" of others on a scale of progress. However, the dualistic traces of anthropology's heritage have not, I think, been fully erased in the process of critique. But one can build on the insight that underlies the critique.
It is well known that modernizationist and developmentalist theories tend to be Eurocentric. They are based on the assumed superiority of Western forms of economic and political organization and the teleological idea that these emerged in Europe and have diffused, or been imposed, globally from there and that they should continue to do so. As King (1995) points out, there is a spatial as well as temporal narrative here, in that modernity has a spatial origin and movement as well as an historical one (see also, Radcliffe, this volume). I would add that there is also a scaling effect at work, in which modernity is seen as large scale or global, while its assumed opposite, tradition, is seen as smaller scale and local: modernity can thus act as a "context" for tradition; it is the "bigger picture" (Englund and Leach 2000) .
Critiques of such Eurocentrism and teleology are legion. García Canclini (1995: 3-7) criticizes the inadequacies of developmentalism. Dussel (1995: 66-7) argues that European modernity constituted itself in opposition to an alterity, a periphery that was concealed and misrecognized. The first of these peripheral Others was Latin America. Escobar (2004: 217-20) outlines the work of a group of Latin American scholars, including Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, and Aníbal Quijano (see also Castro-Gómez 1998). They emphasize the mutually constitutive nature of modernity and coloniality (a term that includes but goes beyond simple colonialism to encompass postcolonial forms of domination). Western modernity was predicated on the domination of the non-West, especially the Americas, the conquest of which began the modern era. Location within the underside of modernity, or better, at the "border" between modernity and coloniality (Mignolo 2000) , can give rise to ethical contestations of the dominant Eurocentric discourse.
Yet it is perhaps more difficult than it appears to root out teleology and scaling effects. One can argue that Latin America has alternative forms of modernity, or an uneven modernity that included what would now be called postmodern forms before postmodernity was seen as a general condition of Western societies, or that the region has complex hybrid combinations of tradition and modernity in which the latter does not displace the former. But it is harder to displace the ideas that modernity itself emerged in Europe, that it emerged there before it emerged anywhere else, that it had uneven impacts on other parts of the world that were not, by definition, (as) modern, and that it has a (more) global scale than other social-cultural forms. These ideas retain a commonsense obviousness that is hard to unsettle, yet they all imply a basic teleology that, while it does not entail a simple goal of inevitable Westernization, still constructs an historical narrative in which Western modernity comes first, shapes the world through its diffusion, and acts as the larger context for other processes.
The premise for the workshop-"When was Latin America Modern?"-that was the basis for this book is a good example of the operation of this teleological and scalar way of thinking. Agreed, the focus on chronology and on the question of when Latin American became modern, if ever, is simply a heuristic device for addressing the more complex question of what modernity is in the Latin American context. But the device supposes a modernity that developed "elsewhere" and "before," and then "arrived" in Latin America, albeit in different ways and at different times and with doubtless contradictory and unpredictable effects. There is an underlying premise of an historical narrative led by this Western modernity that exists beyond, as well as within, Latin America.
A different way of thinking about social change as non-scalar and non-teleological involves seeing all social forms as coeval and at the same scale-or rather sees all forms of periodization or historicization and all attempts at scaling (creating figure/ground devices) as constructions, whether analytic or "popular," with political effects. The idea of modernity as temporally and spatially based in Europe is a construction with evident effects in the realms of power and knowledge. Scaling certain forms as "national" or "global" gives them greater power (see Radcliffe, this volume), as they then act as the context for "local" social forms and processes. Context can then figure in different ways in relation to the local: from being an explanation to being part of the technology of spatial power for making the local respond in certain ways.
A (flawed) parallel for a non-scalar, non-teleological way of thinking can be found in understandings of biological change through natural selection. There is no direction or teleology in the so-called evolution of life processes: new forms (of organisms, DNA, population structures) emerge, but without direction. Forms may spread from one place to another, some forms spread faster than others, some are more ubiquitous than other (flies, humans, some bacteria), but this does not obey a logic of center and periphery or of temporal unilinearity. (The notion of the "anatomically modern human" is, I would argue, a teleological term that is used in evolutionary theory despite its inconsistency with the basic principles of natural selection.) There is also no scale of forms. Some forms are bigger than others, in terms of individual phenotype; some are more numerous as populations. But each form is equally the context for all other forms; no form is "the global" to another form's "local"; all forms are equally global and local at the same time, even if some are much more ubiquitous than others. They are all elements in the same network. This is, of course, a highly complex network and it is interesting that recent work in social sciences and biological and physical sciences have found some common ground in the idea of complex networks that have properties of nonlinearity and emergent self-organization, which emerges endogenously, that is, not as a result of stimulus from the external environment (Escobar 2004: 222; Thompson 2004) . Social science work tends to see such complex networks as the recent product of globalization, but one could proceed from the assumption that social forms have always been networked in this way, but they have been constantly subjected to hierarchical orderings by human agents who scale these networks and give them teleological meaning.
This parallel is (deeply) flawed insofar as the key difference between these biological processes and sociocultural ones is that humans have self-conscious agency and impose design on processes they seek to control. (Of course, notions of design and agency have crept into-and are the subject of debate in-theories about natural selection via metaphors such as the selfish gene and a focus on the individual organism construed as a maximizing reproducer of offspring.) People may design processes to have global and/or local impact and to be progressive and/or traditional. But the key point is that these processes are construed as global/local and modern/traditional by the people who create and enact them and who feel their effects. Being ubiquitous is not the same as being "global": processes such as eating and defecation are very ubiquitous but do not normally get labeled as global or globalizing. Being new is not the same as being modern: new things emerge continuously-things that are not the same as existing things (e.g., babies, conversations)-but not all these are labeled as "modern." Various scholars, from Edward Said to Mignolo and Moreiras, have pointed out that practices of academic knowledge are themselves important examples of how scales and teleologies are constructed so as to create such entities as "Europe" and "Latin America" and to place them in certain relationships of power and knowing (Castro-Gómez 1998; Mignolo 2000; Moreiras 2001 ).
The Persistence of Teleology and Scale
To pursue the question of underlying temporal teleology and spatial scaling persisting in examinations of modernity in Latin America, let us examine two commentaries on Néstor García Canclini's Hybrid Cultures. Both commentators recognize García Canclini's disavowal of modernizationist teleologies, yet both also register doubts about the completeness of this. Beverley (1999: 127) notes that for García Canclini, as for Lyotard, "there is no 'outside' of globalization from which to construct an opposition to it-no 'tradition,' no 'third world,' no 'nature,' no autonomous sphere of popular culture, no modernist hermeneutics of depth." This comment is aimed at a specific target: the idea that there is no authentic site, outside or below global capitalism, which will serve as the basis for constructing resistance. Everything is pervaded by global capitalism and resistance has to be constructed from within this space. But the comment also accords nicely with my argument that we need to think about social change in a way that is non-scalar and non-teleological; the world is not separated into global and local; tradition (and modernity) are ways of reading or construing processes of change, not just things that exist out there. (I read the idea of a "modernist hermeneutics of depth" as akin to a notion of scale.) In his Foreword to Hybrid Cultures, Renato Rosaldo is more skeptical about García Canclini's approach:
Much work in Latin America employs the distinction between the modern and the traditional more as an organising assumption than as a topic for investigation. Yet the distinction is as vexed to me as it is clear to García Canclini. Not unlike notions of the global and the national or the modern and the postmodern, it is evident that both social forces operate in the present and that both are empirically difficult to separate. [. . .] When García Canclini argues that the processes of production and consumption imply that no realm of cultural production can remain independent of the marketplace (and vice versa), it should follow that entering and leaving modernity deconstructs-indeed, dissolves into hybridity-the very distinction between tradition and modernity that he resolutely maintains. (Rosaldo, in García Canclini 1995: xv) Rosaldo thinks that, although García Canclini traces very well the way the modern and the traditional hybridize in Latin American contexts, the concepts of modernity and tradition themselves remain more or less unscathed. My own reading of Hybrid Cultures is less clear on this issue. Certainly, the concepts of tradition and modernity are often deployed in a way that takes for granted what each term means and what it encompasses. On the other hand, parts of the analysis also destabilize both concepts-for example, in the critique of "tradition" as deployed in folklore studies (García Canclini 1995: 147-70 ).
Beverley mounts a slightly different critique-one that could be read as contradicting his comments cited earlier. In Hybrid Cultures, he detects the operation of a "postnational teleology," which is not dissimilar to the national teleology that has been identified in ideologies of mestizaje (Beverley 1999: 127) : "Hybridisation functions . . . as a process of dialectical sublation or transcendence of prior states of dissonance or contradiction in the configuration of a subject, social group or class, national or regional identity. In this sense, Canclini's [sic] argument is essentially modernist, rather than anti-or postmodernist, as it appears at first sight" (127). Again, I am not sure this critique sticks entirely. García Canclini is, in my view, equivocal about whether processes of hybridization reinforce existing power inequalities or help to ameliorate them (García Canclini 1995: 227-8, 239, 241) : there is no necessary transcendence or sublation.
If the critiques of Beverley and Rosaldo are only partially on target, they nevertheless serve to show that dualisms, teleology and scaling effects may linger-or be seen to linger-in recent anthropological approaches to modernity. Seeing Latin American cultures as complex hybrids of modernity and tradition tends to assume that we know what constitutes tradition and modernity in the first place, in order to be able to think the possibility of the hybrid. Tradition ends up being the local, what was there "before" modernity arrived; modernity ends up being construed as something "out there" in the global world, which arrives on the scene. But what if the "traditional" is itself a product of global networks that have been operating in the very long term? What if the "modern" is itself constituted through these same networks and thus not easily distinguishable in temporal and spatial terms from the traditional? Then our attention is turned to how and why the concepts of modernity and tradition are being constructed and deployed, in both academic and nonacademic thinking. As García Canclini says (1995: 141) , "All culture is the result of a selection and a combination-constantly renewed-of its sources. In other words it is a product of a staging."
Englund and Leach give further examples of the persistence of hidden "meta-narratives of modernity" in anthropological work on "multiple modernities." Their empirical material comes from Africa and Melanesia, but their argument is relevant to other regions too.
Three assumptions, they say, underlie work on multiple modernities:
The first is that modernity, full-fledged and recognizable, is everywhere. This assumption precludes teleology; some parts of the world are not somehow less modern than others. The second is that the institutional configuration of modernity cannot be defined in advance. The analyst may choose to highlight witchcraft in one setting, aesthetics in another, and political economy in a third . . . The third is that diverse cultures persist, offering, according to some perspectives, "local" responses to "global" processes.
However, they argue, this approach "cannot obliterate the logical requirement of representing variation against something that is invariable" (Englund and Leach 2000: 228 , emphasis in the original).
This invariably boils down to a meta-narrative of rupture in which the "wider context" of capitalism impinges on local peoples and produces certain reactions, which are intelligible (especially to the analyst) from the privileged perspective of that context. Thus, for example, it is possible to see Melanesian people's concern with money, organ theft, death, and white people as a local reaction, through local cultural lenses, to the encroachment of capitalism-there are obvious parallels with Taussig's argument about the devil and commodity fetishism (Taussig 1980) . Leach argues that their concerns can better be explained in terms of their own cultural understandings of productivity, relationships, and bodies; the "wider context" is not always that of global capitalism.
The Constructedness of "Tradition" and "Modernity"
Anthropology gives various examples of the importance of these processes of construction. Kuper's book, The Invention of Primitive Society: The Transformation of an Illusion (1988) , traces how anthropology consistently reinvented the notion of "primitive society" as a basis for its intellectual endeavors. It needed the idea of some original state of social being, even when social evolutionary paradigms had been discredited in the discipline. Fabian's Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (1983) is a more radical critique of what he sees as the Orientalist project underlying much of anthropology's history, which located the primitive, the traditional, and the Other in the past, even when they were being studied in the present.
A specific example is that of debates about hunter-gatherers. These debates have not focused on Latin America-although they could have done (Pagden 1982 )-but I think the digression is worthwhile.
The academic debate focused on the San (also known as "Bushmen") of the Kalahari desert in southern Africa. One set of anthropologists, the "traditionalists," were accused by the "revisionists" (who were of a Marxist bent), of creating the figure of the hunter-gather tribe, which, according to the traditionalists, still persisted today in parts of the Kalahari and could, with care, be used to make reasonable conjectures about the hunting-gathering way of life as an ecological adaptation that has characterized humans for most of their evolutionary history. Of course, the traditionalists recognized that modernity had in the last few decades taken a huge toll on these relatively isolated peoples. The revisionists argued that, despite appearances to the contrary, the hunter-gatherers had for centuries been integrated into regional and global processes of change, including capitalism, and that their present condition of apparent isolation and "traditionality" was actually a product of this integration, which had, as it were, chewed them up and spat them out, having sucked the desert dry of its useful resources (Kuper 1993; Solway and Lee 1990; Wilmsen and Denbow 1990) .
The debate was acrimonious and polarizing, but it served to show how the figure of the hunter-gatherer could function as an academic construction with which to make arguments about the powers of modernity: either modernity (specifically in the shape of capitalism) had limited powers, which had been braked by the desert fastness of the Kalahari and the determined autonomy of the San; or it was omnipotent, integrating everything and converting the San into desert proletarians. In a review of the debate, Stiles (1992) concluded that hunter-gather peoples all over the world had probably been integrated in uneven ways into much larger circuits of exchange, production, and consumption for some 2,000 years. Rosaldo (1982) argues that so-called primitive peoples may be used as a figure to think about humanity and especially about "modern" people. Questions about "human nature"-violence/peacefulness, territoriality/sharing, patriarchy/gender equality-have often been debated with the figure of the "primitive hunter-gatherer" representing all that is supposedly natural. Stiles's even-handed approach, which assumes that situation normal is one of very long-term codependence, and (uneven) integration into global circuits of exchange, strikes me as a refreshing challenge to common assumptions both about the isolated huntergatherer and about the insidiously transformative omnipotence of capitalism.
In the Latin American context, Taussig (1987) has argued that the figure of the primitive or wild Amazonian native has been constructed and deployed-with the participation of some Amazonian people-as an alter against which to think about other forms of indigeneity (e.g., Andean) and colonial and postcolonial forms of "civilization." His argument is more about the discursive construction of images of Amazonian indigeneity and less about the way Amazonian society has itself been shaped in long-term interactions and integration, although this is implicit in his references to long-term trade in magic and healing. Murphy's study of the Mundurucú, a group living in the lower Amazon valley in Brazil, is more telling in this respect, showing how their social organization, as apparent to anthropologists in the 1950s, was actually the result of changes that had taken place since the eighteenth century, involving their interactions with Spanish colonists (see Wolf 1982) . What appeared to be a local tradition was the product of integration into global networks.
In my own work on the history of Colombian popular music in the twentieth century, I was struck by the concern with "tradition" shown by all those involved with music, whether as composers, players, DJs, record industry personnel, academics, or listeners and dancers. It was very common to assert that the popular music styles that had emerged at various times were a mixture of "traditions" (typically, African, indigenous, and European) and especially of the "traditional" with the "modern." For example, a given style of music was construed by observers as "traditional" to the context of the Caribbean coastal region of Colombia in the mid-nineteenth century. As such it could serve as an authentic basis on which to create more modern hybridswhich then themselves served as the basis for yet further hybrids in the twentieth century. Such was the narrative about porro, the history of which was typically narrated as an indigenous local tradition, hybridized in mid-and late nineteenth century into a brass-band style, which was then hybridized into a jazz-band style in the mid-twentieth century (and later subjected to re-traditionalization in the staging of local traditions of folklore). I argued that the mid-nineteenth-century forms were themselves formed in complex interactions involving Caribbean and European musical practices (Wade 2000) . The "traditional" was as modern as the "modernity" with which it was hybridizing. Each hybrid was seen post hoc as traditional.
Foregrounding/Backgrounding
In this constructionist approach-doubtless all too predictable from a social anthropologist-I am not trying to argue that tradition and modernity are "merely" discursive constructions. Capitalism, science, secular critique, and so on are real social processes that have a history and geography. One can legitimately pose the question of how these processes have occurred in Latin America. I am arguing against a particular way of conceptualizing the processes in question, a way that reproduces subtle dualisms, that maintains a hidden teleology and scaling effect, and that glosses over the manner in which "tradition" and "modernity" are both analytic and popular constructions that foreground and background certain things.
I assume an anthropological approach to these issues to be one that asks what difference it makes to our analysis if we see tradition/ modernity as a discursive analytic couplet. What is hidden and made visible when that couplet is constituted in different ways? If we try to avoid teleology and scaling effects, what might our analysis look like?
Take the example of the idea of race in Latin America. It is common to analyze this question in terms of how ideologies and scientific knowledge about race, coming from Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, arrived in and shaped Latin American intellectuals (and others), perhaps in the process being adapted to suit the particular context of the region in general or a nation in particular (Graham 1990; Stepan 1991) . Also common are reflections on how developments in U.S. race relations have shaped Brazilian ideas about race, whether contrastively (we Brazilians are not racist like them) or by inspiration (we black Brazilians need to be racially self-conscious like African Americans) (Fontaine 1981; Winant 1992) . This is all valuable stuff, but one could also think about how racial science in the United States and Europe was itself shaped by what was going on in Latin America. Obviously, European thinkers were developing their ideas with a global vision of the "races" of the world, but I am thinking more of the way ideas about race in Latin America fed into European ideas, or rather how different ideas were being constituted in a transnational dialogue, which blurred easy dualisms between modern and non-modern, or between local and globaleven if the scientists concerned in Latin America and Europe had clear views about where modernity and progress lay. Dunkerley's resolvedly multilateral and chronology-challenging Americana surely moves in this direction (Dunkerley 2000) . Poole also attempts a history of race and vision that undermines a conventional teleology of modernity: "The currents determining what 'modernity' would be . . . did not flow only in one direction. Rather, the sentiments, practices, and discourses known as European modernity were themselves shaped in important ways by the constant flow of ideas, images and people between Europe and the non-European-in this case Andeanworld" (1997: 21) . In relation to race in particular, she argues that ideas about racial difference did not simply persist from colonial times through to modern times (which, in her Foucauldian timeline, began in the late eighteenth century). Instead, race became visible and seen as natural in new ways in this multilateral constitution of modernity. Images of the Andes and Andean people were important in this process, influencing key thinkers such as Buffon and Humboldt, and feeding both European and Latin American thought on racial difference with hundreds of photographic images of Andean "racial types," taken by both European and Latin American photographers, circulating through Europe and the Americas (Poole 1997: Chs. 3, 5) . Micol Siegel's study of the mutual, transnational constitution of ideas about race in Brazil and the United States in the twentieth century is another excellent example of what I have in mind (Siegel 2001) . She shows how U.S. ideas about race were being formed in relation to Brazil, including by means of visits of black and white U.S. intellectuals to Brazil (despite covert restrictions on the travel of U.S. blacks to the country). At the same time, the reverse process was occurring. U.S. black intellectuals sometimes used the image of racial democracy in Brazil (which they thought their visits reinforced for them) as a means to critique U.S. racial policies. Brazilian black intellectuals tended to avoid more assertively racial stances and to buy into national ideologies of democracy, reinforcing these with liberal ideals about equality and freedom.
This kind of approach shares much with Gilroy's well-known thesis that black identity was constructed in diasporic circuits of exchange across the Atlantic over a period of 150 years.
1 More than this, Gilroy's work argues that modernity itself was constituted in part through these black Atlantic exchanges, for example, through the critiques that black intellectuals made of a Western modernity based on slavery and racism. Social locations often construed as "traditional" and "local," such as black communities in the United States and Caribbean, were actually constitutive of the processes of modernity, such as "double consciousness": "It is being suggested that the concentrated intensity of the slave experience is something that marks out blacks as the first truly modern people, handling the nineteenth century dilemmas and difficulties which would become the substance of everyday life in Europe a century later" (Gilroy 1993: 220-1) . Matory (1999) criticizes Gilroy for neglecting the African side of the equation. Matory shows how Brazilian Candomblé religious centers (which are often seen as, or claim to be, "pure African") were shaped very strongly by Brazilian blacks who went to Africa, where they were educated in English-speaking Presbyterian schools, often became Freemasons, and also made visits to England. They were proud of their English connections and sometimes adopted Anglicized names. In Nigeria, they imbibed Yoruba culture and religion and transmitted that interest and knowledge on to Candomblé practices in Bahia. In turn, the whole position of Yoruba culture and religion in Lagos in the mid-nineteenth century was shaped by returnee migrants from Brazil (some expelled from Brazil as rebels), who found some shelter in the British protectorate in Lagos (and were joined there by free blacks from Sierra Leone, the United States, and Jamaica). These migrants helped local African intellectuals and cultural activists create the Yoruba nation as a self-conscious entity. If black Atlantic culture was constitutive of modernity, then that culture was also being made in complex exchanges that included African agency. In the process, "the African diaspora has at times played a critical role in the making of its own alleged African 'base line' as well" (Matory 1999: 74) . Fundamental to Matory's argument is the idea that Africa is "historically coeval" (ibid.) with the American cultures of which it is often said to be a traditional baseline. One might add that it is also coeval with the European cultures, which are often said to be more modern than it.
A different example might be the music industry in Latin America in the early twentieth century. Again, some standard assumptions about tradition and modernity might underwrite a narrative about modern recording techniques and their associated industry emerging in Europe and the United States, whence they spread into other areas, including the Caribbean and Latin America, creating local versions and hybrids. This is a powerful narrative-incontestable in some respects, particularly I suspect in relation to technical innovation. But it also backgrounds and misrecognizes the way this industry had a global dimension from very early on and actively constituted itself as an industry in the excursions its agents made into Latin America and other areas of the globe to record artists; in the interactions between the industry HQs in the United States and the local agents who doubled as retailers, PR men, and talent scouts; and in the creation of recording and production operations in Latin America.
The international recording industry began effectively with the founding of the Victor Talking Machine Company in 1901 and the Columbia Gramophone Company in 1903. From the early 1900s, these companies made "overseas recordings" by sending teams of representatives to foreign countries with stacks of wax blanks and recording machines which, although rudimentary, were quite portable. Using hotel rooms, local artists were recorded and the recorded blanks then used to make pressings back in the United States. Victor recorded thus in Mexico from 1905 and also Cuba. In the 1920s and 1930s, Victor established factories and studios in Santiago and Buenos Aires, not to mention Yokohama and elsewhere (Fagan and Moran 1986: 521) . These companies also had networks of sales representatives all over Latin America and the Caribbean who, apart from selling phonograms and recordings, also recruited local talent. Such talent might travel at first to New York or Camden, NJ, and later to Buenos Aires or Santiago to make recordings.
The first recordings of Colombian musicians, made in New York around this period, give some idea of the multilateral movements of people and music (Wade 2000 This indicates the opportunist mix between the "national" and the "international" in the recording and marketing strategies of the record companies. On the one hand, national images were important. Songs were labeled with names that had definite national associations. Tango "came from" Argentina, rumba and guaracha from Cuba, ranchera from Mexico and bolero from Cuba-although Mexican singers and composers soon established themselves as leading exponents-while bambucos, porros, and cumbias came from Colombia. It is no accident that Murillo recorded the Colombian national anthem. On the other hand, the market and the recording techniques were highly transnational: musicians of many Spanish-speaking nationalities-not just Latin American, but Spanish and Canary Island too-played together, often in house orchestras that simply played sheet music sent in from different Latin American countries. Artists played many different styles alongside their "national" ones and the various styles were marketed all over Latin America. Some musical terms were not national. For example, the label "canción" (song) was often used. One singer of many canciones for Victor in this period was Juan Pulido, who was born in the Canary Isles, lived in New York, Cuba, and several other Latin American countries: this is typical of the transnational nature of this very generic style.
This indicates that notionally "national" repertoires were being produced in highly transnational circuits of production and exchange, both in terms of musical ideas and actual recordings. In the process, as Roberts (1979) has argued, "modern" music was being formed in these multilateral exchanges that not only defied national boundaries and categorizations but also conceptual divisions between tradition and modernity-even if, as always, people constantly deployed categorical distinctions of nation and modernity/tradition.
Conclusion
The question that inspired this collection asks when Latin America became modern. My answer is that it has always been modern, or as modern (and traditional) as anywhere else. This is not to deny differences between regions of the world and much less to deny power differences and economic inequalities. It is rather to question implicit teleological and scaling effects that place Latin America "after" modernity and as a "local" example of a global process that has its center elsewhere. It is to recognize the role of Latin America as constitutive of modernity, and thus coeval and colocated with it. It is one thing to recognize spatialized differences in technologies, in cultural practices, and social structures, and to enquire into the emergence and distribution of these-in a word, to investigate social change. It is another to channel that investigation into preformed spatiotemporal categories such as modernity and tradition or some iteration of center and periphery, which introduce subtle effects of teleology and scaling, even when the aim is to avoid such effects.
In my view, the notion of multiple modernities does not, in itself, avoid these problems. Anthropologists typically talk in terms of multiple modernities, which are formed by local people adapting globalizing cultural forms and producing hybrids in often unpredictable ways that maintain simultaneous dynamics of homogenization and differentiation. Wilk, among others, has argued that such hybrids often differentiate in similar kinds of ways: the globalizing forces set up basic structures of common difference, within which localities ring the changes (Wilk 1995) . This puts the global and local back into a hierarchical relationship, in which the former holds the whip hand, but this particular version of the idea is not entailed by the basic notion of multiple modernities. My worry is about the way hidden effects of scaling and teleology remain in these ideas of modernities. This is not to say that the notion of modernity/ies should be abandoned. People not only use the concept all the time in everyday life, but put into practice projects based on the idea, projects that, like much human activity, attempt to create teleology, not only because they are themselves goal directed, but because they seek to establish such goals as models for social action. But this does not necessarily mean we should use the concept as an analytic one. Any analytic concept channels the attention in some directions and not others, but precisely because "modernity" comes charged with so much baggage, I think we need to be very careful about how we deploy it. All too easily, the concept reinforces dualisms and oppositions-between modernity and tradition, global and local-that need to be dissected and questioned. The critique of multiple modernities by Englund and Leach (2000) demonstrates how this happens very well.
Exploring concepts of modernity in the Chilean mining city of Antofagasta, Corsín Jiménez (2005: 171) concludes that "there is no place where one can locate 'modernity,' and in this sense it might be wiser to do without the term." His argument is that people use the term with reference to many different scales of change: changes in political economy, urban design, the politics of identity, the place of history in local identity, centralism and localism in national politics, a program of family values and practices of consumption. "We may call all these effective changes 'expressions of modernity' but this is all the heuristic value the concept will afford us. [. . .] The concept of modernity may speak to us about people's attitude to and aspirations for change. But the concept serves little more than a heuristic purpose, for it points to complexity, but does not elucidate it" (Corsín Jiménez 2005: 172, 173) . In a sense, Corsín Jiménez is saying that the concept means too many different things for too many people to serve an analytic purpose. I agree, but would also add that hidden meanings also get smuggled into the analysis in ways that foreground some aspects of the situation being analyzed, while others remain in the background or are even made invisible. The danger lies precisely in the heuristic usefulness of the term: with such a handy hold-all concept, it is hard to disaggregate the various conceptual tools that are being brought to bear. Note 1. Dunkerley (2000: 53) notes that Philip Curtin and Fernand Braudel both previously espoused notions of an Atlantic system of economic and intellectual exchange.
